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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Claimant-Appellant Judith L. Weible ("Weible") appeals from the decision 
of the Idaho Industrial Commission ("Commission") finding she was employed 
during a mutually agreed temporary leave of absence from Employer-Respondent 
Safeway, Inc. (''Safeway"), and, consequently, was ineligible for unemployment 
benefits. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
In early September 2014, \Veible applied with IDOL for unemployment 
benefits. R., Exhibit p.4. On October 10, 2014, IDOL mailed its determination 
finding Weible ineligible for unemployment benefits. R., Exhibit p.7. 
Weible timely appealed from the determination by letter dated October 14, 
2014, which was received by IDOL via fax on October 15, 2014. R., Exhibit 
pp.14-15. A telephonic hearing on the appeal was held October 28, 2014, before 
an Appeals Examiner of IDOL's Appeals Bureau. Tr., p.5, 11.10-12. In a written 
decision dated October 31, 2014, the Appeals Examiner affirmed the denial of 
benefits. R., Exhibit pp.I of 5 - 5 of 5. 
An appeal to the Commission was filed by Weible on November 4, 2014. 
R., pp.7-8. IDOL entered its notice of appearance. R., pp.11-12. The 
Commission conducted a de nouo review of the record and on January 29, 2015, 
entered its decision finding Weible ineligible for unemployment benefits. R., 
pp.13-17. 
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On February 4, 2015, Weible filed a request for reconsideration with the 
Commission, R., pp.19-21, which was denied on March 20, 2015. R., pp.22-24. 
On March 25 or 26, 2015, Weible timely filed a notice of appeal to the 
Idaho Supreme Court. R., pp.25-28. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
Weible, a part-time worker with Safeway in northern Idaho, Tr., p.18, 
11.21-22, developed a medical condition requiring surgery. E.g. Tr., p.19, 11.21-22. 
Weible informed Safeway that she would need to take some time off for her 
surgery and subsequent recovery. Tr., p.19, 11.12-13. It was mutually agreed 
that Weible could take time off from work and, most important, that Safeway 
would hold Weible's position for her. Tr., p.20, 11.3-7; R., Exhibit p.10. 
Weible began her leave of absence in early September, 2014. Tr., p.11, 1.4; 
R., Exhibit p.5. Weible applied for unemployment benefits with the Idaho 
Department of Labor ("IDOL"), and in her report of September 15, 2014, Weible 
indicated she was able to work and available for work. R., Exhibit p.18. In her 
reports for the next four weeks, Weible checked the boxes affirming she was not 
able to work and not available to work. R., Exhibit p.19-22. This prompted an 
inquiry by IDOL and the adjudicator assigned to the matter discovered that 
Weible was on an "agreed upon leave of absence." Tr., p.10, 11.6-14. 
IDOL received a fax from Weible on September 22, 2014. R., Exhibit pp.3-
4, pp.9-11. Weible stated on the cover page of the fax that she was off work due 
to a surgery. R., Exhibit p.9. Her fax also included a letter from Safeway's 
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assistant store manager, which read in part: 
To whom it may concern: 
At this time, Judy Weible is on a medical leave. Judy is 
unable to return to work until after October 27, 2014, per her 
doctor. We will put her back on the schedule as soon as October 
28th, 2014. 
R., Exhibit p.10. 
Based upon these uncontroverted facts, the adjudicator issued a 
determination dated October 10, 2014 finding Weible ineligible for 
unemployment benefits. R., Exhibit p.13. The decision was appealed and on 
October 17, 2014, a notice was issued setting the matter for telephonic hearing on 
October 28, 2014. R., Exhibit 1, pp.1-2. 
At the appeals hearing, the facts set forth above were developed. Weible 
freely admitted during the hearing that she was on temporary leave from her job 
at Safeway, and that her job was being held for her until she could work again: 
[APPEALS EXAMINER]: ... [B]ut you're under the understanding 
that they were going to hold your job for you; is that correct? 
MRS.WEIBLE: Yes. I knew they were going to hold the job for me. 
Tr., p.20, 11.3-7. 
On October 28, 2014, the date of the hearing before the Appeals Examiner, 
Weible had been cleared to work with only a 25 pound weight restriction. Tr., 
p.18, 11.13-14. Weible testified that she expected to go back to work that same 
day after the hearing. Tr., p.15, 11.3-9. Weible also testified that before the date 
of the hearing, she was unable to work: "I couldn't go back to work until -- until 
today. I had to have time to recover from this." Tr., p.16, 11.9-10. 
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The Appeals Examiner upheld IDOL's determination of ineligibility, 
finding that Weible was not unemployed according to Idaho Code § 72-1312: 
"[Weible] was on a mutually agreed upon leave of absence for medical reasons 
and was, therefore, not unemployed." R., p.3. 
Following Weible's timely appeal, R., pp.7-8, the Commission conducted a 
de novo review. R., p.13; see LC. § 72-1368(7). It made the following findings of 
fact: 
1. Claimant worked for Employer. She required surgery and 
requested time off. Employer granted Claimant's request 
and agreed to hold Claimant's job until she was able to 
return to work. Claimant intended to return to her job once 
she was able. 
2. Claimant returned to work on October 28, 2014. 
3. Claimant filed for benefits during the time she was off work 
due to her surgery. Each week she reported she was not able 
or available to seek full-time work. 
R., p.14. 
The Commission, after quoting extensively from Coates v. Bingham 
Mechanical & Metal Products, Inc., 96 Idaho 606, 533 P.2d 595 (1975), and also 
IDAPA 09.01.30.375.02, concluded -- as did IDOL and the Appeals Examiner --
that Weible was not unemployed during her time off from work: 
The employment relationship between Claimant and Employer has 
not been severed, but rather temporarily interrupted due to 
Claimant's medical condition. It is undisputed that Claimant 
requested, and Employer granted, time off from work for her to 
have surgery. Further, Employer agreed to hold Claimant's job 
until she was medically able to return to work. Claimant intended 
to return to work and did so on October 28, 2014. 
R., p.15. The IDAPA provision quoted by the Commission m support of its 
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decision is on all fours with the facts of this case: 
02. Leave of Absence. A claimant who is on a mutually agreed 
upon leave of absence is employed and not eligible for benefits. In 
order to meet the definition of "leave of absence," the employer 
must have committed to the claimant's return to work at the end of 
the leave. 
IDAPA 09.01.30.375.02. 
Because Weible was on a mutually agreed leave of absence, and both 
Weible and Safeway intended that she would return to work once fully recovered 
from the surgery, the Commission understandably found that Weible had not 
severed her employment relationship with Safeway and thus was ineligible for 
benefits. R., p.16. 
Weible requested that the Commission reconsider its decision. R., pp.19-
21. On reconsideration, the Commission expressed its sympathy for Weible but 
nonetheless found she had remained employed during her leave of absence: 
The Commissioners have read Claimant's protest letters and are 
sympathetic to the position she was placed in by her required 
surgery. Simply, Claimant did not receive unemployment benefits 
for her time off from work because her relationship with Employer 
did not end. In order to receive unemployment benefits, the 
employment relationship with Employer must be permanently 
severed. Both Employer and Claimant Weible wanted her to return 
to her job once she recovered. Her employer encouraged Claimant 
to return to her job at Safeway once she was recovered from her 
surgery. Claimant Weible testified at hearing that she had 
returned to her previous job with restrictions from her doctor. 1 
Because Claimant maintained an employment relationship with 
Employer, she was not considered "unemployed" under Idaho law. 
1 This finding may not be entirely accurate. Weible did not testify that she already had 
returned to work; rather, she testified that she would return to work later that same day 
of the telephonic hearing. Tr., p.18, 11.13-14. The discrepancy is of no import because 
under either facts, the result is the same, viz. Weible remained employed during her 
leave from Safeway. 
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R., p.23. The Commission concluded, "There is no legal or factual reason to 
charge Employer's account for the time Claimant was off work for her medical 
recovery." Id. 
Weible timely appealed to this Court. R., pp.25-26. 
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ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Are the Commission's findings that Weible remained employed during her 
leave of absence from work and thus was ineligible for unemployment benefits 
supported by substantial and competent evidence? 
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ARGUMENT 
Substantial and Competent Evidence Supports the Commission's 
Findings that Weible Remained Employed During Her Leave of Absence 
from Work and Thus Was Ineligible for Unemployment Benefits 
A. Standard of Review 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Commission finding that Weible 
was ineligible for unemployment benefits because she remained employed during 
a temporary leave of absence from her employer, Safeway. 
Article V, § 9 of the Idaho Constitution vests the Idaho Supreme Court 
with jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Industrial Commission, and also 
expressly limits the scope of the Idaho Supreme Court's jurisdiction "to questions 
oflaw." Id. In accord with this jurisdictional limitation, this Court has explained 
that it is "constitutionally compelled to defer to the Industrial Commission's 
findings of fact where supported by substantial and competent evidence," Locker 
v. How Soel, Inc., 151 Idaho 696, 699, 263 P.3d 750, 753 (2011), quoting Teffer v. 
Twin Falls School Dist. No. 411, 102 Idaho 439, 439, 631 P.2d 610, 610 (1981), 
and that "[b]ecause the Commission is the fact finder, its conclusions on the 
credibility and weight of the evidence will not be disturbed unless they are 
clearly erroneous." Locker, supra. 
Substantial and competent evidence is "such relevant evidence that a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Folks v. 
Moscow School District No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 836, 933 P.2d 642, 645 (1997). 
Under this standard of review, all facts and inferences are to be viewed in the 
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light most favorable to the prevailing party before the Commission. Sadid v. 
Idaho State University. 154 Idaho 88, 94, 294 P.3d 1100, 1106 (2013). This Court 
has often stated it will not reweigh the evidence, or consider different conclusions 
that may be drawn from the evidence. E.g., Folks, supra. 
B. The Commission's Findings Are Supported By Substantial and Competent 
Evidence 
"The general rule in Idaho is that an unemployment compensation benefit 
claimant bears the burden of proving his or her eligibility for benefits." Parker v. 
St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 417, 614 P.2d 955, 957 (1980) (acknowledging 
general rule and holding misconduct, being in the nature of an affirmative 
defense, is an exception to general rule and must be proven by employer). This 
not an employee misconduct case; thus, Weible has the burden of proving her 
eligibility for benefits. 
To prove her eligibility for benefits, Weible was required to demonstrate, 
inter alia, that she was unemployed, able to work, and available for suitable work 
during any benefit period. See, e.g., LC. § 72-1312 ('"Compensable week' means a 
week of unemployment"); I.C. § 72-1307 ("'Benefits' means the money paid to an 
individual with respect to his unemployment."); LC. § 72-1366(4)(a)(i) (subject to 
various exceptions, claimant must be "[a]ble to work, available for suitable work, 
and seeking work"). 
Being unemployed as a condition for unemployment benefits -- while self-
evident and required by, inter alia, I.C. §§ 72-1307, 72-1312, and 72-1366(4)(a)(i) 
-- flows from the purposes of the Employment Security Law: 
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The Act is social legislation, designed to alleviate economic 
insecurity and to relieve hardships resulting from involuntary 
unemployment; to encourage employers to provide more stable 
employment. The Act does not cover those who are unemployed 
resulting from their own fault. The Act was clearly intended to 
provide benefits for those unemployed under prescribed conditions 
who are able and willing to work, but unable to secure suitable 
employment on the labor market. 
Johns v. S. H. Kress & Co., 78 Idaho 544, 547, 307 P.2d 217, 219 (1957) 
(emphasis added). Accord I.C. § 72-1302 (declaration of state public policy). The 
Employment Security Law is not a welfare entitlement intended to assist 
individuals afflicted with medical hardship. It is directed at the unemployed who 
have been discharged by, or separated from, their employers through no fault of 
their own, and who are ready, willing and able to accept work. Id. 
The principal issue addressed by the Commission was whether or not 
Weible remained employed by Safeway during her leave of absence. There are a 
number of Idaho cases where a similar issue arose, though in differing contexts. 
One lesson, or point of law, that may be garnered from these cases is that the 
intentions of the employee, and to a lesser degree those of the employer, are 
important, if not determinative, to the issue of whether or not the claimant is 
unemployed. 
In Totorica v. Western Equipment Co., 88 Idaho 534, 401 P.2d 817 (1965), 
a union of workers called a formal strike and their employer responded by 
replacing the striking workers. A good portion of the Court's discussion centered 
upon a provision of the unemployment compensation statutes, since removed 
from the Idaho Code, that denied benefits when a worker was unemployed 
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because of a "stoppage of work which exist[ed] because of a labor dispute." 
The Court in Totorica held the phrase "stoppage of work" referred to a 
stoppage of business activity at the employer's establishment rather than 
unemployment on the part of the applicant for benefits. It then addressed the 
argument that the striking worker voluntary left his employment without good 
cause and thus was ineligible for unemployment benefits. The Court in Totorica 
quoted the following from a Hawaii Supreme Court opinion, expressly approved 
its reasoning, and directed that the reasoning be followed: 
Moreover, the terms "leaving work" or "left his work" as used in 
unemployment compensation laws refer only to a severance of the 
employment relation and do not include a temporary interruption 
in the performance of services. . .. Absence from the job is not a 
leaving of work where the worker intends merely a temporary 
interruption in the employment ... relation. Such is the case of 
strikers who have temporarily interrupted their employment 
because of a labor dispute. Under the prevailing view, they have not 
been deemed to have terminated the employment relationship and 
the voluntarily leaving disqualification has no application to them. 
Totorica, supra, 88 Idaho at 542, 401 P.2d at 820 (emphasis added), quoting from 
Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd. v. Akahane, 377 P.2d 715, (1962). 
Coates v. Bingham Mechanical & Metal Products, Inc., 96 Idaho 606, 533 
P.2d 595 (1975) followed the holding in Totorica that the fact finder should 
examine an employee's intention regarding his or her return to work in 
determining whether a temporary interruption of work constitutes "leaving work" 
without good cause. In Coates, a number of union workers walked off their jobs 
with a sheet metal subcontractor to protest its hiring of non-union workers. The 
Commission ruled that Coates, one of the workers who walked off the job, was 
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ineligible for unemployment because he had voluntarily left his employment 
without good cause. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed. It held that although 
Coates' situation did not involve a formal union strike, the reasoning of Totorica 
should be followed. The Court pointed to a Commission finding that the workers 
did not intend to terminate their employment, and held: 
Since the appellants did not leave their employment in the sense 
required by LC. § 72-1366(f), the subsequent conclusion of law by 
the Commission that the walkout precipitated Bingham's 
withdrawal from the job is immaterial and is no basis for denial of 
employment insurance benefits. The statute, as interpreted by 
Totorica, requires an intent to leave the employment. Absent the 
necessary intent, the ramifications of the action should not be 
considered. 1 Clearly the statute is so worded as to preclude an 
employee from voluntarily quitting a job and subsequently applying 
for unemployment benefits. The Commission itself determined that 
the appellants did not intend to guit their jobs. 
Coates, supra, 96 Idaho at 608, 533 Idaho at 597 (emphasis added). In footnote 1 
of its opinion, the Court distinguished another case based upon the claimant's 
intent in Coates: "It is this issue of intent that distinguishes this case from 
Johns v. S. H. Kress & Company, 78 Idaho 544, 307 P.2d 217 (1957), wherein the 
record indicates the employee was fully aware that her actions would in all 
probability result in dismissal." Id., 96 Idaho at 608 footnote 1, 533 Idaho at 597 
footnote 1. 
Gray v. Brasch & Miller Const. Co., 102 Idaho 14, 624 P.2d 396 (1981), 
reviewed a situation where claimant Gray periodically would leave his job for an 
extended period to attend school at Idaho State University and then return to his 
job when school was over. In December 1978, Gray concluded his studies at 
Idaho State and returned to resume his job only to find that his employer's 
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business was shut down due to inclement weather. The Commission found that 
Gray had voluntarily quit without cause when he departed for his studies and 
thus could not obtain benefits upon his return. The Court in Gray reversed. The 
Court noted that "[t]he uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony of both 
employer and employee clearly indicates that Gray's attendance at Idaho State 
was in the nature of a 'leave of absence' from work." Gray, supra, 102 Idaho at 
16, 624 Idaho at 398. It then quoted the then-exiting administrative rule that 
addressed leaves of absence: "A claimant on leave of absence or vacation is 
employed and not eligible for benefits." Gray, citing Rule 202.18.1. The Court 
concluded that because there always existed an intent for Gray to resume work 
after his hiatus at Idaho State, during school and upon his return Gray remained 
employed. The Court further held that unemployment benefits should not have 
been denied because Gray became unemployed, not as a result of voluntary 
choice, but as a result of inclement weather and the cessation of the operations of 
his employer. The Court held: 
Id. 
The record indicates that, while variously characterized, the 
employer and the respondent agreed on a leave of absence 
situation. This uncontroverted testimony [concerning the intentions 
of employer and employee], taken in conjunction with the quoted 
rule and the case law requiring severance of the employment 
relationship as a prerequisite to unemployed status, is indicative 
that the Commission's finding of termination [when Gray last left 
for school] is without foundation. 
IDOL's current "leave of absence" administrative rule is consistent with 
the reasoning of Totorica, Coates and Gray. The rule, which was quoted by the 
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Commission below, reads as follows: 
02. Leave of Absence. A claimant who is on a mutually agreed 
upon leave of absence is employed and not eligible for benefits. In 
order to meet the definition of "leave of absence," the employer 
must have committed to the claimant's return to work at the end of 
the leave. 
IDAPA 09.01.30.375.02. 
Other states have developed a similar rule. For example, the Court of 
Appeals of Missouri held: 
"In ordinary usage, the term "leave of absence" means that the 
employee is given permission to be absent from work for a certain 
time, at the expiration of which the employee will return to his 
employment status." Trail v. Industrial Commission, 540 S.W.2d 
179, 182 (Mo.App.1976). When an employer and employee agree on 
a leave of absence, the employee does not voluntarily quit her job. 
Id. 
Ward v. Acoustiseal, Inc., 129 S.W.3d 392, 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
extended leave of absence without consent of employer was quitting of job 
without good cause). Accord 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 403 
("Where there is a leave of absence mutually agreed on by the employer and 
employee, the employee does not voluntarily quit his or her job for purposes of 
determining eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits."); and, e.g., 
Roche v. Bd. of Review, 383 A.2d 453, 455 (App. Div. 1978) ("A leave of absence 
connotes a continuity of the employment status not conditioned upon such things 
as contingent availability of employment or change of heart."); S. Cent. Bell Tel. 
Co. v. Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n, 357 So. 2d 312, 317 (Miss. 1978) 
("[A]n employee who voluntarily takes a leave of absence is not unemployed for 
the period of time during which their work is only temporarily suspended."). 
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The facts of the instant case, as in Gray, are uncontroverted. Weible was 
on a temporary medical leave from Safeway, and the intentions of both Weible 
and Safeway were that Weible would resume her work once she recovered from 
her surgery. Safeway stated in a letter submitted to the adjudicator that "We 
will put [\Veible] back on the schedule as soon as [medically cleared]," and 
provided a specific date for her return, October 18, 2014. R., Exhibit p.10. 
Weible also candidly affirmed her intent to return to work after her recovery: 
[APPEALS EXAMINER]: ... [B]ut you're under the understanding 
that they were going to hold your job for you; is that correct? 
MRS.WEIBLE: Yes. I knew [Safeway was] going to hold the job for 
me. 
Tr., p.20, 11.3-7 (emphasis added). 
The temporary nature of Weible's leave, her intentions, and those of 
Safeway also were demonstrated by the fact that, on October 28, 2014 -- the date 
of the hearing before the Appeals Examiner -- Weible testified she expected to 
work that same day. Tr., p.15, 11.3-9. 
This evidence is both substantial and competent and supports the 
Commission's finding that Weible was not unemployed during her leave of 
absence. 
Weible emphasizes in her arguments to this Court, and below, that she did 
not understand she would be on a "leave of absence": 
I didn't realize that it was going to be considered a leave of absence 
and I thought, you know, when you had to have something medically 
done -- like this done that you would still be allowed unemployment. 
Tr., p.16, 1.22 - p.17, 1.1. However, the label "leave of absence" is not 
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determinative; what is determinative are the underlying facts. The facts show 
that Weible's time away from work was temporary and both she and her 
employer understood that she would return to work as soon as she was medically 
fit to do so. The facts, not the label alone, demonstrate that Weible was not 
unemployed, and Weible has failed to meet her burden of proving otherwise. 
Weible's belief that "when you had to have something medically done 
you would still be allowed unemployment" misapprehends the purposes of the 
Employment Security Law. Its focus is not to provide monetary assistance to 
workers who no longer are able to work; rather, it provides assistance to 
individuals who are unemployed through no fault of their own and are able to re-
join the workforce. See Johns v. S. H. Kress & Co., 78 Idaho 544, 547, 307 P.2d 
217, 219 (1957). 
Weible's mistaken belief is at direct odds with this policy, with the 
requirement that claimants be "[a]ble to work, available for suitable work, and 
seeking work," LC.§ 72-1366(4)(a)(i), and with IDAPA 09.01.30.100.07: 
07. Withdrawing from Labor Market Because of Illness. A 
claimant who withdraws from the labor market because of illness or 
injury prior to filing a claim is not eligible until he is able to work 
and available for work. 
If Weible had been unemployed during her leave of absence, as she apparently 
urges, then Weible would have fallen squarely within the language of this rule, 
and would have remained ineligible for benefits. 
As an aside, Weible also failed to prove benefit eligibility requirements of 
being available to work and being able to work. She testified to the opposite: "I 
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couldn't go back to work until -- until today. I had to have time to recover from 
this." Tr., p.16, 11.9-10. 
The uncontroverted facts support the conclusion that Weible was ineligible 
for unemployment benefits for a number of reasons, including the finding that 
her "leave of absence" precluded receipt of benefits. The Commission's conclusion 
denying benefits could be affirmed for other reasons as well. E.g. Stroud v. Dep't 
of Labor & Indus. Servs., 112 Idaho 891, 893, 736 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Ct. App. 1987) 
(court affirming Commission on other ground). However, that does not appear 
necessary because substantial and competent evidence supports the findings of 
the Commission that formed the basis for the denial of benefits. 
C. Conclusion 
It is for the Commission to determine the credibility and weight to be given 
to the testimony; its finding will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. 
Locker, supra, 151 Idaho at 699, 263 P.3d at 753. Substantial and competent 
evidence supports the Commission's finding that Weible remained employed 
during her mutually agreed temporary leave of absence from Safeway and thus 
was ineligible for unemployment benefits. The Commission's decision should be 
affirmed. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
17 
CONCLUSION 
Substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's finding 
that Weible's leave of absence did not sever her employment relationship with 
Safeway and that she was ineligible for unemployment benefits. Weible's appeal 
was brought frivolously and without a reasonable foundation in law and/or fact. 
It is respectfully requested that this Court affirm the Commission's decision 
below. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
DOUG WERTH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
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